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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RAI IP.ZAR ANT 11 I ON, 
Pl,w1tiff-Aprwllant, 
,·.,, Case No. 19338 
lRlJ nr I;[ VIHV OF THE: INDUSTRIAL 
LiJ:;,;,\ISSIOI' 01 i 1T Ml, DEPARTr,\ENT OF 
c·'.'PL()'cl 1,rnT SEC IJF<IT Y, 
Def cr 1dJ1 it- Re, pondent. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEIENDANT-RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATE~\ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Rrs1•r,r1<ic11t petitions for rehearing from a unanimous decision of 
Baltazar Antillon v. Department of 
f 1 ,rl1 ·,, 111 C.,ccur11_{. No. 19338. The Court reversed the decision of the 
1 1'J'J',l 1 1 ii ( 1 H1.r111--,~inn <-1fter reviewing the entire record of the case, reading 
I,, ,,,f,, or llH l'ilrt1es and hearing oral argument on the issues. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Tt,e Rc,pondent in its Petition for Rehearing at p. 3 asserts that 
0rr<'rl 111 its Findings of Fact on two issues: 
1. On page 3 of its decision the Court marl0 tlw lolluw 11 " 1 
No heilrinti date W<b ever set, no hc.iri11q 
has yet been held, and no further .JCtio11 I·"'' 
been taken by the INS on Antillon's appl1t <1t1oro 
for permanent residency. 
2. On page 2 of its decision the Court statC'd: 
In July, 1980, on J brief vacation t" 
Mexico, Anti I Ion filed papers to become ;i 
permanent resident of the United States with 
the American consul in Chil;iualua [sic l. ~1exico. 
That application and accompanying records were 
later transferred to Salt Lake Cit\', Utah, the 
closest Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) office to Antillon's home acJcJrPss. 
Appellant submits that these Findings of Facts were 110t 111coir•, 
but were based upon the record transmitted by the Respondent to this h· 
and certified pursuant to Rule 75[g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In its petition for rehearing Respondent also attPml-'ts to i1'trcc:· 
new evidence into this case via an affidavit attached to the brief. A1,1:c'i'" 
contends that this evidence cannot be introduced dt this latr cl1tr ,1 
requests that the facts as presented on appeal are complete, ,1cc11r ~tc arr·· 
only basis upon which the review of the petition for rehe;iring can L;ike pldC 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING SHOULD RE DFNIEO. 
A. Rehearing is Granted in Rare lnstanc.es. 
The general rule in petitions for rehecirinq is that they •hou:1 '·' 
be granted. In Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 272, 11 P. 512 (188hl 11 11 r,,, 
noted: 
[T Jo justify a rehearing, a strong case must he 
made. We must be convinced that the Court foiled 
to consider some material point in the case, or that 
it erred in its conclusions, or that some matter h.1s 
been discovered which was unknown at the time of 
hearing. 
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f<r,· p<wdcnt has failed to meet this burden and is simply attempting 
Resp<11<dent's contention that the Findings of Fact relied on by the 
r,,1rr t were 111 error and justifies granting his petition for rehearing is 
'"' 111,,ut 111erit. The first alleged factual error was made, if at all, by the 
Kcspo11dent below. It was one of the facts relied upon by Respondent to 
(R.0025). Respondent, pursuant to Rule 75(g), 
1ransm1ttcd the tr,ir1'cript and record and certitied that it was accurate and 
c"m~lcte, The rwly problem v.ith the record ever claimed by the Respondent 
wJs that it w:1s incomplete and Respondent subsequently transmitted a 
supplement;i I record. No other objections to the record were made and 
Respondent cannot now argue that the facts below were incorrect. 
Responde11t';, C<J11tention is not timely and in any event, fails to demonstrate a 
strong case 1ustifyinr1 rehearing. 
The 'econd point of error alleged by Respondent also fails to meet 
the standards required to justify a rehearing. The fact that the U. 5. 
Immigration end Naturalization Service re-initiated proceedings subsequent to 
J cnr,,plc•lion of the ,1dministrative hearings held in determining Appellant 
Ar,ti1lr,n's eliriihility for unemployment benefits does not affect the Court's 
cJecisrr,n or requir·e the decision to be changed or modified. The finding of 
he Co<rrl w,15 tl1.1t, at the time Appellant Antillon applied for and received 
:rr:r1»1. lw w0, cl1qilile for those benefits as an alien "permanently residing 
trrr ''''t"'I St.i\e,, under color of law" within the meaning of 35-4-5-(k)(i) 
'"'"' Cr1rlP A111H1t,1tf'Ci (1953 <JS amended). 
p Rr''P'""IPnt's Petition Cannot be Granted Since it is 
T~,.,~i'(l-Upon Points Not Previously Raised. 
fl pct1ti1Jn for rE'i1earing cannot be granted based upon points or 
C\i' 1'' 11 <l v1h1ch lr;rc, 11ot previously been raised. Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 
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541, 142 P. 716 (1914); Swanson v. Sims, 51 Ut<Jh 334, 170 f'. ;;,,, 1~, 1 , 
re Lowes Estate, 68 Utah 49, 249 P. 128 ( 1926). 
Respondent attempts to introduce new evidence, 1n thr· 11,ni, ,,. 
affidavit appended to its Brief in Support of Petition for Reheurinn 
Respondent's reliance on Flick v. Van Tassel. 5117 P.2d 201 (1976) dr,c, ,,,. 
support its attempt to introduce this new evidence. Rcspo11rlen l relit, 
dicta in Flick which indicates that there may be a case where evide 11 ce 
introduced below might be considered by the Court. However, i11 111 1, 
as in Flick, there is no reason to allow new evidence. kesponrlcnt has 
discovered new evidence which was not previously availahle. The rule ri 
Court is to examine cases on appeal based on the record. It must 
"examine things dehors the record" where as here no "misu11derstJnd111r ,, 
fraud, reflecting unconscionability" exists [Flick, supru]. 
Allowing the affidavit at this late date also has the effect c1f forcic 
the Court to "believe and accept anything which il losing lil1LJa11t 1.1ui 
subscribe to without benefit of reply or cross examination" Flick Jt 
This is not the purpose of rehearings. The Court must rely on l11e mrc 
created by the parties. 
Appellant raised the collateral effect of attempts at non~rre,,r· 
hearsay evidence in his brief on appeal (See Point 11). For reasr1no rc1 1' 1 
therein, evidence of a hearsay nature such as this affidavit not 'uLjec' · 
examination must be carefully examined and suspect. 
The long standing principle is that when, as here, the 1 r,111 1 
evaluated and considered points raised by the ResponcJeril 111 11 1• 
hearing, a petition for rehearing should not be granted. Brown v~ 
supra; People v. Rogerson, 4 Utah 483, 11 P. 618 (1886); Jones v. Hnu\C, 
Utah 483, 11 P. 619 (1886). 
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POINT II. 
Tllf l!ECISION OF THE COURT IS NOT IN ERROR. 
L, r11c lJ"CLISSI0'1 Ill the Congressional Record Supports 
TIICITPrision of the Court. 
Rr·~pu11dent has mustered language of the Congressional debate 
surroundinu Ilic adoption of an amendment to the unemployment 
u,1,1pensotion st<ittJtc. However, the discussion does not affect the decision of 
tlii; Court. As noted in Respondent's petition at page 10 the Sisk Amendment 
provided: 
(14) compensation shall not be payable on the basis 
of services performed by an alien who was not lawfully 
admitted to the United States; 
This µrovisi1111 doc' not include the category of aliens who are "permanently 
residinr, in the United States under color of law." 
The 1s ,uco r0ised by the Appellant and determined by the Court 
were wheHw1 I 1) Coricircss created three exceptions to the general rule 
rleny1n1J lwndits, drld ( 2] whether Appell<:int was a member of that class of 
clie1" "pPrmc1wntly residin'J in the United States under color of law". 
Stctutor1 construction dpplied by the Court is bolstered by the Congressional 
Rernrd debates rel icd on by the Respondent. The Sisk Amendment was 
inorl1t1ecl to reflect three exceptions to those aliens "not lawfully admitted to 
thio Uri1ted StutC's:" The semicolon after this phrase bolsters the Court's 
1nteq.iet0tiori of ~35-S-4(k)(i) since it suggests that exceptions will follow. 
A1iopt11J11 of the position urged by Respondent in its position for 
" 11 ' 11 '"'I '<VllUl<i have the effect of judicially implementing the language of the 
'"' .An1C·11dmerit which was modified by the three exceptions to the general 
- 5 ---
B. The Court Evaluated the Cases Raiserl by Respondent 
in Making Its Dec1s1on. 
Respondent's argument and reliance on _Du'."1~~R'"'' "" 
Industrial Commission, 199 Colo. 95, 606 P. 2d 437 ( 1980) v"'' 1 "' ,, " 1,, ', 
and considered by the Court. The case is distinguishable since it :iuu 1 
the "availability" provision of the unemployment statute ancJ not the "cl,, 
disqualification" provision. 
The Court properly relied upon Rubio v. Employment Division 11 
Ore. App. 525, 674 P.2d 1201 (1984), the only other c""'' wl"d' sreuiic,i', 
reviewed the eligibility provisions within the generill exclLh1011 of al cc 
receiving benefits. Applying the facts of the present Cilse to the stc1tu:e, :1-
Court correctly determined that both Antillon and Rubio werr rPsicling 111 11-
United States under color of law as provided for within the meaninr; 01 I" 
unemployment statute. 
Respondent raises no new concerns regarding the aprlic,1tio11 oi 11 , 
statute, therefore, the decision of the Court in its st<Jtutory const1ur1 '' 
should stand. 
C. The Court's Finding That Appellant's Presence was 
Known was Based on the Uncontroverted Record BeTOW:--
As noted above, the evidence attempted to be introcluceo by '1-
Respondent at this late date is not timely or prorerly before this lnur 
However, even if this Court should consider the concerns raise' 
Respondent they do not effect the decision of the Court. The Crn1rt locr" 
and the record supported a finding that Appellant was under docvet c1·111 ' 
of the INS as of January 30, 1984 when he was issued an 1-94 111 " 
departure document. ( R. 0029, 0057). The Appel I ant testified th.it 
date he continued to notify I NS of his presence and chancJeS ,,f addn''-
There is nothing in the record to the contrary. 
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... 
/1 1,1wlldnt h<1s consistently argued that he is "under color of law" 
:LI t: 1,c 1,,,5 " p1·occ•dur;il right to remain in the United States until action 
lw nq11eol fen discretionary relief is taken. (See Appellant's Brief at 
l\,int ! l. Thr Court had sufficient evidence to justify its decision that INS 
knew of Aµpell,111t's presence. 
l=vents subsequent to the time he applied for and received benefits 
10ctober. 19eJ, sef' Respondent's brief at 23), do not affect the decision of 
1his CourL As defined in Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977) and 
Jrgued by Appellant in his brief, an individual may be "permanently residing 
1
n the U S. ,. even though it is a relationship which "may be dissolved 
eventually oit the instance of either the United States or of the individual", 
!:l,olley at SSO, Appellant's brief at 10. Therefore, even if the action taken by 
INS subsequent to the application for benefits eventually results in a 
dissolution of his permanent residence under color of law, that will not occur 
u11t1I Jction on his applications are completed. The Court's decision 
recognizes Apµ~llJnt's argument that no action to remove Appellant from the 
IJnited St;ites Cdn occu1· until his case is adjudicated by an inmigration judge. 
Until that puint, Mr. Antillon will not be required to leave the country and 
there will be no determination of the veracity of the charges in the Order to 
Show Ct=iL<se. For these reasons the decision of the Court is correct and 
rehcJrinrJ should not be granted. 
POINT 111. 
M'f't=I l /\NT \VAS ENTITLED TO ALL THE BENEFITS HE 
fffl fclVrclJ AND OTHER BENEFITS HE HAS BEEN 
ll[Nll:D. 
Tlw t111al 0rqument raised by Respondent is that under the Court's 
rleci·.i"'' /l1,pelL111t wJs not entitled to benefits for his January 5, 1981 claim 
because he w.i, not in the United States under color of Jaw during the whole 
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of his base year. The facts, as supported by the record, 1r1cli"''' ,1 




made known his presence to officials in Mexico (R.0033). The flPri<•<f ,,• 
essential to determine Mr. Antillon's right to receive benefits is )q wcel.' 
time period in which the Appellant was "permanently res1dinq "' the llr.•i, 
States under color of law". Therefore, the decision of the Court, ~lthc,, 
technically mistaken was correct. The point r<Jised by ResporHJe 11 t doc,, 
give rise to fraud or unconscionability, therefore, its petition for rerecir:' 
should be denied and Appellant's benefits should be reinstated immcrliJ\,"'\' 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent's attempt to raise new evidence to secure 
rehearing is not properly before this Court and does not support 1t< pe11·1 
for rehearing. The Respondent's arguments were fully ev~luiltecl h., " 
Court before but found not to be persuasive in determi11inq v.hell•r-r 
Appellant was entitled to unemployment benefits. Action taken by I i'S 1' · 
the time that Appel I ant applied for and received benefits dob 
retroactively negate Appellant's presence "under color of law". The 
correctly determined that once Appellant made himself and his rresence /, 
to officials he was residing in the United States under color of law. Fir.2 
the base period relied upon by the Court was correct dnd entitles Ar•P'" 
to the benefits he received and additional weeks of benefits. Fe•• 
foregoing reasons the Respondent's petition for rehearing should lie •l•• 1w 
Respectfully Submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INl. 
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